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Abstract 
 
Designing a quantum key agreement (QKA) protocol is always a challenging task, 
because both the security and the fairness properties have to be considered 
simultaneously. Recently, Zhu et al. (Quantum Inf Process 14(11): 4245-4254) pointed 
out that Shukla et al.’s QKA protocol (Quantum Inf Process 13(11): 2391-2405) has 
some security flaws (which lead to the Participant Attack). Moreover, they proposed an 
improvement to avoid these weaknesses. However this study points out that the 
improved protocol also suffers from a colluding attack, i.e., two dishonest participants 
in the protocol can collaborate to manipulate the final secret key without being detected. 
Keywords Quantum key agreement, Bell states, Quantum cryptography, Participant 
attack 
1 Introduction 
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard proposed the first protocol of quantum key distribution 
(QKD) [1]. After that, several QKD protocols have been proposed [1-9]. QKD protocol 
helps the participants to establish a secret key through quantum channels. However the 
shared secret key is determined by the sender or the third party and then distributed to 
the participants. In a QKD protocol the participants cannot contribute equally to the 
final key. Hence in 2004 Zhou et al. proposed the first quantum key agreement protocol 
[10]. In contrast to the QKD protocols, each participant in QKA protocols can equally 
contribute their private key to establish the final secret key. The balance of the 
participants’ contribution to the final key is thus a very serious consideration in the 
design of QKA protocols. And the design of a fair QKA has become an imperative 
research topic in quantum cryptography.   
In 2010, Tsai et al. [11] pointed out that Zhou et al.’s protocol [10] cannot achieve 
fairness property. That is, one participant in the protocol has the ability to manipulate 
the final secret key without being detected by the other participant. In the same year, a 
QKA protocol based on the BB84 was proposed by Chong et al. [12]. In 2013, Shi et 
al. presented a multi-party quantum key agreement (MQKA) protocol [13] based on the 
Bell state and Bell measurement. Subsequently, Liu et al. [14] pointed out Shi et al.’s 
protocol [13] is not secure and instead proposed another MQKA protocol with single 
particles. In 2013, Sun et al. [15] proposed an improvement to improve the efficiency 
of Liu et al.’s protocol [14]. However, Huang et al. in [16] pointed out Sun et al.’s 
improvement cannot achieve fairness property. 
In 2014, Shukla et al. proposed two QKA protocols based on Bell state and Bell 
measurement [17]. The first one is a two-party QKA protocol and the other is an MQKA 
protocol. However, recently, Zhu et al. [18] pointed out that Shukla et al.’s protocol 
suffers from several weaknesses and subsequently they proposed an improved three-
party QKA protocol, which, they claimed, can ensure both the fairness and an enhanced 
level of security. However, this article shows that Zhu et al.’s protocol cannot achieve 
the fairness property. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of 
Zhu et al.’s protocol. Section 3 analyzes Zhu et al.’s protocol and points out that two 
dishonest participants in the protocol can collaborate to manipulate the final secret key. 
Finally, a brief conclusion is given in Section 4. 
2 Brief review of Zhu et al.’s protocol [18] 
In this section, we briefly review Zhu et al.’s QKA protocol, in which three participants 
Alice, Bob and Charlie are involved using four different kinds of Bell state
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to establish a secure and fair key. This protocol consists of the following steps: 
Step 1 Alice prepares n pairs of 
 and divides them into two sequences
A
p and
A
q .
A
p and
A
q are composed of all the first particles and the second particles of 
 pairs. Alice also prepares two random binary bit sequences  = 0,1
n
A A
K

and  = 0,1
n
A A
R

.
A
K can be considered as Alice’s key. Similarly, Bob and 
Charlie generate  , , ,B B B Bp q K R and  , , ,C C C Cp q K R . 
Step 2 Alice generates
2
n
pairs of 
 as decoy photons and concatenates them with
A
q to form a new sequence
A
q . Subsequently, Alice applies a permutation 
operation
2n
A on Aq to get a new sequence Aq and sends Aq to Bob. Similarly, 
Bob generates
B
q and sends it to Charlie, Charlie generates
C
q and sends it to 
Alice. 
Step 3 After receiving the authentic acknowledgment of receipt from Bob through the 
authenticated channel, Alice announces the details of permutation operation
2n
A . Bob picks the decoy photons out and applies Bell measurement on them. 
If the error rate is found to be within the tolerable limit, they continue to the 
next step, otherwise they abort the protocol. At the same time, Bob and Charlie 
check the transmission, Charlie and Alice check the transmission. 
Step 4 After having discarded all decoy photons, Bob obtains 
A
q according to the 
details of permutation operation
2n
A . Subsequently, Bob performs I or X on
A
q  according to
B
K . Then Bob applies another additional unitary operation I
or X according to
B
R  to get a new sequence
Ab
q . i.e. Bob performs I or X on
A
q  according to
B B
K R . After this, Bob concatenates
Ab
q with decoy photons 
and applies permutation operation
2n
B
 on them to obtain a new sequence Abq . 
Subsequently, Bob sends Abq to Charlie. Similarly, Charlie generates Bcq and 
sends it to Alice, Alice generates Caq and sends to Bob. 
Step 5 The same as Step 3, participants check whether there is any eavesdropper exists 
in the transmissions 
Step 6 Follow the similar way as Step 4, Charlie obtains Abq and performs I or X on it 
to get a new sequence
cAb
q . After this, Charlie concatenates
cAb
q with decoy 
photons and applies permutation operation
2n
C
 on them to obtain a new 
sequence Abcq . Subsequently, Charlie sends Abcq to Alice. Similarly, Alice 
sends Bcaq to Bob, Bob sends Cabq to Charlie. 
Step 7 The same as Step 3. participants check whether there is any eavesdropper exists 
in the transmissions. 
Step 8 Bob and Charlie first announce the details of the additional unitary operation
B
R
and
C
R . Charlie announces the details of the permutation operation
2n
C
 after 
having known
A
R and
B
R . Subsequently, Alice discards all decoy photons and 
rearranges the received sequence to obtain
cAb
q . Then Alice performs Bell 
measurement on  cA Abp q to get the values of A B B C CM K R K R    . 
Obviously, Alice can obtain the value of
B C
K K according to  , ,A B CM R R . 
Then Alice generates the final shared secret key =
A B C
K K K K  . Similarly, 
Bob and Charlie can obtain the final key K . 
3 Problem with Zhu et al.’s QKA 
According to Zhu et al. [18] , the fairness property of a QKA protocol specifies that all 
involved participants can equally influence the final shared secret key. i.e. no non-trivial 
subset of the participants can manipulate the final shared secret key. 
In this section, we try to show that Zhu et al.’s protocol cannot achieve the fairness 
property. That is, the final shared secret key can be manipulated by two dishonest 
participants. Let us assume that Alice and Charlie are these two dishonest participants. 
In Step 6, Charlie obtains Abq and sends it to Alice. Subsequently, Alice performs Bell 
measurement on A Abp q to obtain B BK R . For example, if the measurement result of 
the i th pair of  A Abp q is
 , Alice and Charlie can deduce that Bob’s unitary 
operation is ,I which means =0i i
B B
K R . Otherwise, if the measurement result is
 , 
they can deduce that =1i i
B B
K R . At the same time, Alice sends Bcaq to Bob. So Alice 
and Charlie can obtain the value of B BK R in Step 6, and Bob cannot detect it. After 
this, in Step 8, Bob announces the details of the additional unitary operation BR . At this 
time, Alice and Charlie can compute  =B B B BK K R R  to obtain Bob’s private key
B
K .  
If Alice and Charlie want to manipulate the final secret key, they can control the 
values of AR or CR without being detected by Bob. After receiving the details of the 
permutation operation
2n
A
 in Step 8, Bob rearranges the received sequence to obtain
Bca
q and performs Bell measurement on  ,B Bcap q  to obtain the measurement result
B
M . Subsequently, Bob uses =A C B A CK M R R   to get the OR values of Alice and 
Charlie. However, if Bob gets a different additional unitary operation AR or CR , then 
he will get a different values A CK  . Hence, Bob will get a manipulated final secret key 
without detection.  
As an example, we use the generation process of 2-bit key to explain the above 
attack. Suppose that =11AK , =10BK , =00CK , =00AR , =01BR and =11CR . As 
above attack shows that Alice and Charlie can obtain =11B BK R  in Step 6. After 
receiving =01BR in Step 8, Alice and Charlie can get the value of BK ,
   = = 10 01B B B BK K R R   01=10 . At this moment, Alice and Charlie obtain 
the final secret key = 11 10 00 01A B CK K K K      . If they want transform 
the final secret key from =01K to =11K , Alice announces =00AR and Charlie 
announces =01CR . After Bob obtain the value of BM , =B A C AM K K R  
00
C
R  , he computes the final key as = B A CK M R R  00 00BK   
01 10 11  . It denotes that Bob gets a manipulated final key without detection. The 
above analysis shows that Zhu et al.’s protocol cannot achieve the fairness property. 
4 Conclusions 
This article points out a Participant Colluding Attack on Zhu et al.’s quantum key 
agreement protocol, where two dishonest participants can manipulate the final secret 
key without being detected by the other participants. In this regard, Zhu et al.’s QKA 
protocol cannot achieve the fairness property.  
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